RésuméLes auteurs présentent le problème de l'omniscience logique qui entrave la formalisation de la connaissance et de la croyance dans la thhrie des mondes possibles. Ils étudient ensuite les solutions qui s'inspirent de la distinction entre croyance implicite et explicite proposée par Levesque, et celles qui se fondent sur la logique de la conscience de Fagin et Halpern. Pour remédier aux insuffisances de ces solutions, ils proposent de concevoir la croyance explicite à partir d'une fonction d'analyse logique qui filtre les (...) propositions selon leur profondeur, ce qui permet de justifier logiquement et structurellement la limitation du pouvoir déductif des agents. (shrink)

Prof. Ruth Barcan Marcus created quantified modal logic in 1946. She extended the Lewis calculus S2 to cover quantification. Quantified modal logic became an essential tool for the rigorous study of natural language in the hands of R. Montague in the late sixties. Some complex phenomena cannot be properly handled at the level of sentences. Recent researches in formal semantics have concentrated on discourse and led to a rich amount of results. Logical theories introduced for the logical study of programs (...) play an important role in these developments. We shall present a detailed account of the connection between dynamic logic and “static” logic. The core of the paper will be the translation of dynamic logic into S5. Developping an insight due to Prof. J. van Eijck, We shall offer a simplified version of the latter translation. The paper also relates to P. Gärdenfors' Knowledge in Flux. (shrink)

In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's, Gärdenfors and Sahlin's, and Kyburg's, though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.

We study conditions for a topological space to be metrizable, properties of metrizable spaces, and the role the axiom of choice plays in these matters.

This is a continuation of [2]. We study the Tychonoff Compactness Theorem for various definitions of compactness and for various types of spaces . We also study well ordered Tychonoff products and the effect that the multiple choice axiom has on such products.

We study the relationships between definitions of compactness in topological spaces and the roll the axiom of choice plays in these relationships.

We investigate, within the framework of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF, the interrelations between weak forms of the Axiom of Choice AC restricted to sets of reals.

Compiles the photographs taken by Leonard Freed of the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, during which Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his "I Have a Dream" speech.

New communication technologies such as the microcomputer, videotex/teletext systems, the videocassette recorder, and satellite receiving dishes have been available to farmers since the early 1980s. This longitudinal study examines ethical issues associated with the impact that differential patterns of adoption and use of these technologies have had on inequalities among farmers from 1982 to 1989. The results demonstrate a strong adoption and use bias toward larger scale farmers who already have well-developed skills for handling information. This bias is especially strong (...) for microcomputer and videotex/teletext systems, and it isincreasing over time. Although the same farmers are not adopting all communication innovations, there is a strong tendency toward the already information-rich making the most use of the innovations they adopt. The article concludes with several recommendations that would help minimize some of these information inequalities. (shrink)

In this paper we briefly examine and evaluate Quine’s physicalism. On the supposition, in accordance with Quine’s views, that there can be no change of any sort without a physical change, we argue that this point leaves plenty of room to understand and accept a limited autonomy of the special sciences and of other domains of disciplinary and common-sense inquiry and discourse. The argument depends on distinguishing specific, detailed programs of reduction from the general Quinean strategy of reduction by explication. (...) We argue that the details of the relations of particular sciences, disciplines and domains of discourse depend on empirical evidence and empirical-theoretical developments and that the generalized approach of reduction by explication is also subject to related empirical-theoretical constraints. So understood, physicalism lacks much of the controversial force and many of the implications sometimes associated with it. (shrink)

One of the core debates concerning equity in the response to the threat of anthropogenic climate change is how the responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should be allocated, or, correspondingly, how the right to emit greenhouse gases should be allocated. Two alternative approaches that have been widely promoted are, first, to assign obligations to the industrialized countries on the basis of both their ability to pay and their responsibility for the majority of prior emissions, or, second, to assign emissions (...) rights on a equal per capita basis. Both these proposals ignore intra-national distributional equity. Instead, we develop a policy framework we call 'Greenhouse Development Rights' which allocates obligations to pay for climate policies on the basis of an individually quantified metric of capacity and responsibility . Crucially, the GDRs framework looks at the distribution of income within countries and treats people of equal wealth similarly, whatever country they live in. Thus even poor countries have obligations proportional to the size and wealth of their middle and upper classes, defined relative to a 'development threshold'. While this method nominally identifies the 'right to development' as applying to people, not countries, as a proposal for a treaty among sovereign nations, there is no obvious way to give legal meaning to that right. In this paper, then, we raise some of the philosophical and political questions that arise in trying to quantify capacity and responsibility and to use the 'right to development' as a principle for allocating costs.*. (shrink)

Uncertainty and affect are fundamental and interrelated aspects of the human condition. Uncertainty is often associated with negative affect, but in some circumstances it is associated with positive affect. In this paper, we review different explanations for the varying relationship between uncertainty and affect. We identify “mental simulation” as a key process that links uncertainty to affective states. We suggest that people have a propensity to simulate negative outcomes, which results in a propensity towards negative affective responses to uncertainty. We (...) also propose the existence of several important moderators of this process, including context and individual differences such as uncertainty tolerance, as well as emotion regulation strategies. Finally, we highlight important knowledge gaps and promising areas for future research, both empirical and conceptual, to further elucidate the relationship between uncertainty and affect. (shrink)

One of the core debates concerning equity in the response to the threat of anthropogenic climate change is how the responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should be allocated, or, correspondingly, how the right to emit greenhouse gases should be allocated. Two alternative approaches that have been widely promoted are, first, to assign obligations to the industrialized countries on the basis of both their ability to pay (wealth) and their responsibility for the majority of prior emissions, or, second, to assign (...) emissions rights on a (possibly modified) equal per capita basis. Both these proposals ignore intra-national distributional equity. Instead, we develop a policy framework we call ‘Greenhouse Development Rights’ (GDRs) which allocates obligations to pay for climate policies (both mitigation and adaptation) on the basis of an individually quantified metric of capacity (ability to pay) and responsibility (prior emissions). Crucially, the GDRs framework looks at the distribution of income within countries and treats people of equal wealth similarly, whatever country they live in. Thus even poor countries have obligations proportional to the size and wealth of their middle and upper classes, defined relative to a ‘development threshold’. While this method nominally identifies the ‘right to development’ as applying to people, not countries, as a proposal for a treaty among sovereign nations, there is no obvious way to give legal meaning to that right. In this paper, then, we raise some of the philosophical and political questions that arise in trying to quantify capacity and responsibility and to use the ‘right to development’ as a principle for allocating costs.Footnote**The ‘Greenhouse Development Rights’ (GDRs) framework is a collective project. The core team includes the author, Tom Athanasiou, Sivan Kartha and Eric Kemp-Benedict; this is the ‘we’ that appears where the text refers to the project, as in ‘we intended this’, and so on. This paper, however, is primarily the author's own product and, beyond the description of GDRs, my collaborators have not read or approved it; thus much of the writing and philosophical speculation uses the first person singular. And, while credit for useful work goes to all team members, the blame for philosophical sloppiness remains with the author. (shrink)

The Critique of the Power of Judgment is the third of Kant's great critiques following the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. This translation of Kant's masterpiece follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. This volume, first published in 2000, includes: the indispensable first draft of Kant's introduction to the work; an English edition notes to the many differences between the first and second (...) editions of the work; and relevant passages in Kant's anthropology lectures where he elaborated on his aesthetic views. All in all this edition offers the serious student of Kant a dramatically richer, more complete and more accurate translation. (shrink)

The essay begins with a detailed consideration of the introduction of incommensurability by Feyerabend in 1962 which exposes several historically inaccurate claims about incommensurability. Section 2 is a coneise argument against causal theories of reference as used as arguments against incommensurability. We object to this strategy because it begs the question by presupposing realism. Section 3 introduces and discusses a hypothesis that w'e call meta-incommensurability which provides the reason for the wide-spread accusation of question-begging and use of circular argumentation among (...) the proponents of both realist and non-realist interpretations of science. (shrink)

Recent work within psychology demonstrates that unconscious cognition plays a central role in the judgments and actions of individuals. We distinguish between two basic types unconscious social cognition: unconsciousness of the influences on judgments and actions, and unconscious of the mental states that give rise to judgments and actions. Influence unconsciousness is corroborated by strong empirical evidence, but unconscious states are difficult to verify. We discuss procedures aimed at providing conclusive evidence of state unconsciousness, and apply them to recent empirical (...) findings. (shrink)

The dynamic nature ofGame-Theoretical Semantics is emphasized. The role of strategic meaning in accounting for linguistic competence is examined. The semantics of epistemic possibility is shown to involve a dynamic ingredient. Update semantics has been designed to capture it. The paper focuses on the interplay betweenlogical and linguistic competences indiscourse understanding.

The dynamic nature ofGame-Theoretical Semantics is emphasized. The role of strategic meaning in accounting for linguistic competence is examined. The semantics of epistemic possibility is shown to involve a dynamic ingredient. Update semantics has been designed to capture it. The paper focuses on the interplay betweenlogical and linguistic competences indiscourse understanding.

The essay begins with a detailed consideration of the introduction of incommensurability by Feyerabend in 1962 which exposes several historically inaccurate claims about incommensurability. Section 2 is a coneise argument against causal theories of reference as used as arguments against incommensurability. We object to this strategy because it begs the question by presupposing realism. Section 3 introduces and discusses a hypothesis that w'e call meta-incommensurability which provides the reason for the wide-spread accusation of question-begging and use of circular argumentation among (...) the proponents of both realist and non-realist interpretations of science. (shrink)

W. van Orman Quine is one of the leading philosophers in America today. His thinking, however, has received little attention from philosophers in continental Europe. This book is a systematic and critical account of Quine's philosophy which aims at isolating what is of lasting value in his work. Each of his major theses is submitted to a thorough examination both from within and from without his general standpoint. Quine's positions have changed a great deal over the years in response to (...) external criticism and to internal stresses and strains. These changes are described and assessed. Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is considered in the light of non-monotonic logic. The multi-farious versions of his holism are brought together and evaluated. Dummett's objection to the effect that holism is inconsistent with empiricism is refuted. lt is argued, however, that the controversial thesis of the indeterminacy of translation becomes implausible as soon as learnability constraints are brought to bear on the matter. Quine's new definition of logical truth in terms of grammatical structure is vindicated. It is shown how the apparent conflict between his earlier and his later views on ontology can be superseded. Can Quine hold a relativist view of ontology and at the same time maintain a non-relativist theory of truth? Can he hold that truth is internal to theories and claim that scientific theories are underdetermined by observational data without lending support to relativism? An affirmative answer to the first question is defended. It is argued, however, that Quine could not meet the second challenge. Quine's penetrating criticism of modal logic has prompted several research programs. Paul Gochet exhibits the interrelations between these programs and argues that Quine's objections against modal logic can be met without any commitment to doctrines such as essentialism. Of interest to: Philosophers, logicians, linguists. (shrink)

1. IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT In 1900, in A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leihniz, Russell made the following assertion: "That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a proof". 1 Forty years later, the interest aroused by this notion had not decreased. C. J. Ducasse wrote in the Journal of Philosophy: "There is perhaps no question more basic for the theory of knowledge than that of the nature (...) of 2 propositions and their relations to judgments, sentences, facts and inferences". Today, the great number of publications on the subject is proof that it is still of interest. One of the problems raised by propositions, the problem of deter mining whether propositions, statements or sentences are the primary bearers of truth and falsity, is even in the eyes of Bar-Hillel, "one of the major items that the future philosophy oflanguage will have to discuss". 3 gave a correct summary of the situation when he wrote in his Ph. Devaux Russell : Since Peano and Schroder who, in fact, adhered more faithfully to Boole's logic of classes, the logical and epistemological status of the proposition together with its analysis have not ceased to be the object of productive philosophical controversies. And especially so since the establishment of contemporary symbolic logic, the foundations 4 of which have been laid out by Russell and Whitehead. * 2. (shrink)

In this paper I shall examine the interrelationships holding between four of the main theses of Quine's philosophy. (1)Ho1ism (2)Underdetennination of scientific theories (3) Indeterminacy of translation (4) Ontological Relativity -/- These four doctrines have generated a lasting controversy: in one interpretation they seem to be false and in the other they are threatened to collapse into triviality. Moreover it has been claimed that they cannot be consistently upheld together. I shall argue, on the contrary, that they are true, original (...) and mutually consistent. (shrink)

In this paper, Chateaubriand’s account of the productivity of language is put to an historical perspective. Its philosophical significance is assessed. It is shown how it could be expanded to accommodate recent findings of professional linguists.O presente artigo analisa o tratamento da produtividade da linguagem oferecido por Chateaubriand de uma perspectiva histórica. Seu significado filosófico é avaliado. Também se mostra que este tratamento poderia ser expandido de forma a incluir descobertas recentes de lingüistas profissionais.